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SUSAN D. CARLE*
Much dispute surrounds quesitons of women's "special" experience
in the legal profession. This issue has become a lightening rod for
the "sameness/difference" debate in feminist legal academia.
Feminist scholars such as Carrie Menkel-Meadow have made the case
for women lawyers' special perspectives'; equally respected theorists
have cautioned against such arguments.2 These arguments have
taken place mostly within the realm of theory, with some borrowing
from social psychology studies by Carol Gilligan and others.3
Sociologists who have sought empirical verification of women's
special lawyering perspectives by studying contemporary legal
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workplaces have reached conflicting results.4 Far too little work has
approached the question of women's experiences in the law from a
careful, historically sensitive perspective. 5
J. Clay Smith's Rebels in the Law,6 which examines the perspectives
of leading black women lawyers from the 1890s to the present, and
Virginia Drachman's Sisters in Law,7 which studies women lawyers'
experiences from the 1860s to the 1930s, both make significant
contributions in remedying this deficit. What these two books reveal,
especially when read together, are the ways in which women's
perspectives on their professional lives and on the law are both
deeply shaped by their experiences of gender and race in particular
social milieus and historical periods, and, at the same time, variable
and unpredictable.
The women lawyers on which Smith and
Drachman focus largely agree that their perspectives have been
shaped in important ways by sex, race, or the combination of both,
but describe vastly different conclusions based on those experiences.
And although some part of the great range of perspectives presented
in these two books can be accounted for by differences in historical
period and social situation, significant variation remains that can only
be attributed to the idiosyncrasies of individual personality. We thus
walk away from these books convinced equally that sex and race have
mattered a great deal to lawyers' lived experiences in the law, and
that the ways in which these factors have mattered are in many
respects not amenable to broad-brush generalizations.
J. Clay Smith is renowned for his earlier magnum opus,
Emancipation,s an invaluable resource that collects virtually all known

historical evidence about early black lawyers. Emancipation does not
exclude black women lawyers from its coverage but, because the
number of black women lawyers was historically so tiny, the book's
focus necessarily stays with black men's experiences in the law. Rebels
in the Law appears to be Smith's effort to make up for his earlier
4. Compare Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the Difference Model for
Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 309 (1990) (reporting on empirical findings
establishing no clear correlation between gender and lawyering approaches) with Dana Jack &
RandJack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alternatives,57 FoRDHAM L. REV. 933 (1989) (applying
Gilligan's framework to women lawyers). See also Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Gender
Inequality in Law: Problems of Structure andAgency in Recent Studies of Gender in Anglo-American Legal
Profeasions,23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 681 (1998) (reviewing recent additions to this literature).
5. See Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer's Persona,22 HARV. WOMEN'S
Lj. 239 (1999) (making arguments for such an approach).
6. REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERs
1998) [hereinafter REBELS).
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heavy emphasis on black men's experiences in the law by giving black
women lawyers a "book of their own." Unlike Emancipation,however,
Rebels in the Law is not a detailed historical chronicle of black women
lawyers' struggles and accomplishments; instead, it consists of a
sampling of writing by black women lawyers, organized by broad
topics such as "The Power of Black Women," "Race, Equality, Justice,
and Freedom," and "International Concerns." 9
Having approached Smith's book with the expectation that I would
find jewels of historical insight about black women lawyers
comparable to the treasure trove of research in Emancipation,I admit
to initial disappointment at the format of Rebels in Law. But a careful
reading of the essays collected there convinced me of the format's
advantages. Each of the texts chosen for inclusion is rich with
interest and complexity. The reader is thus left to apply her own set
of questions to the primary texts, unmediated by another historian's
interpretations.
Moreover, the reproduction of entire texts or large parts of texts
highlights the range and diversity in concerns, conclusions, and
writing styles of the black women lawyers represented in the
collection. We see areas of strong disagreement, as in Jewell Rogers
Stradford's staunch defense of U.S. Supreme Court candidate Robert
Bork's civil rights credentials, 0 which readers will recognize as at odds
with the positions of others represented in the book. We read
accounts of various pivotal moments in the careers of prominent
black women attorneys in the national political spotlight, including
Mary Frances Berry's account of her lawsuit against President Ronald
Reagan for firing her from the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in the
early 1980s" and Lani Guinier's gracious but impassioned statements
after President Clinton abandoned her nomination as Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights.12 We read Joyce Anne Hughes'
telling account of the forms of discrimination she encountered as a
professor at the University of Minnesota law school in the 1970s,
where a dean took seriously student complaints about her but not
about other professors, and extended the period of her probationary
appointment on the grounds that she had displayed insufficient
collegiality. 3 As Hughes explains, sounding a complaint that still
9. Smith, REBELS, supra note 6, at vii-x. Other topics are "Law and Its Call to Black
Women," "Legal Education, the Legal Academy, and the Legal Profession," "On Presidents and
Judges," and "Crime and CriminalJustice." Id.
10. SeeSmith, REBELS, supra note 6, at 128-30.
11. SeeSmith, REBELS, supra note 6, at 118.
12. See Smith, REBELS, supra note 6, at 123-27.
13. SeeSmith, REBELS, supra note 6, at 96-100.
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resonates with some women and minority professors today, in even
the most purportedly progressive law schools:
Such a desire [for collegiality] would have been welcome if it
meant that one could retain viewpoints influenced by the Black
experience and retain one's personhood as an African-American
woman. But to the extent that [it] requires masking one's ideas
and demands that one 14become an "honorary" white male, then the
offer must be rejected.
Although there is little in the book that is directly in Smith's voice,
his presence is pervasive throughout; he has, after all, made all the
editorial and organizing decisions that give the book its coherence
and focus. The key disadvantage to the fornat Smith has chosen for
Rebels in Law is the lack of analysis to provide context and connection
among the selections. In reading the selections, the reader begins to
formulate her own hypotheses - for example, it appears as if the
black women lawyers writing early in the century are more focused on
the barriers to law practice posed by gender than by race, while
writers in the 1960s and 1970s are more focused on the problems of
racial oppression. Writers in the 1980s and 1990s seem to articulate
the complexity of the interconnections between race and gender as
modes of discrimination.
Such an hypothesis has a certain
plausibility, given general trends in the historical periods in question.
But without further guidance by the editor, the reader cannot know
whether Smith intended through his selection of particular readings
to steer her towards such comparisons. It is in this respect that
Smith's decision not to overtly inject himself into the book's
discussions is most problematic. The reader may find herself wishing
for Smith's voice, as the trustworthy historian who could helpfully
steer her towards a better understanding of general themes and
trends in the materials.
It is possible that Smith refrained from providing such commentary
out of a sense that it was not his place to interpret experiences across
the divide of gender. If this is so, Smith's restraint is unfortunate. As
the breadth and diversity of the voices that emerge from the book
demonstrate, further expansion of our knowledge about race,
gender, and the legal profession requires more voices from more
perspectives. Indeed, one can hardly imagine a scholar whose voice
would be more welcome on the issues raised in Rebels in Law than that
ofJ. Clay Smith.
Smith does offer introductions to the book and to each of its
sections, but these are short and not particularly informative. The
14. See Smith, REBELS, supra note 6, at 99 (footnote omitted).
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reader continues to have many questions, including queries about
methodology. How, for example, did Smith decide which lawyers
should be represented in this book, and which writings by these
lawyers to include? Did he articulate formal selection criteria; if so,
what were they? Did Smith work collaboratively with the many living
lawyers included in the anthology in choosing which writings to
include, and, if so, how did those collaborative processes take place?
How many documents did Smith consider in all? How did he
conduct his searches for documentary evidence? How much of the
universe of such documents did he locate? What materials would
warrant further examination? Answers to these and related questions
would be enormously helpful to future scholars.
Despite these omissions, Smith's book remains an invaluable
contribution to scholarship about race, gender, and the legal
profession. It provides a rich and wonderful resource that can
provide the basis for Smith or some other scholar to prepare a
companion volume to Emancipation that will chronicle and analyze
black women lawyers' experiences in a more comprehensive and
definitive manner.
Those interested in the subject of women in the legal profession
will probably already be familiar with much of Drachman's new book,
Sisters in Law, which consists primarily of reworked material from
major articles Drachman published in Law and SocialInquiry, Michigan
Law Review, and other journals. Despite the prior publication of
much of the material Drachman presents, Drachman's synthesis of
her decades-long research in book form allows for many new insights,
especially on matters of change through time. Drachman traces, for
example, the trajectory of women's thinking about their progress in
the bar, starting with a pioneering period in the late 1900s and first
decades of this century, in which women lawyers were breaking
barriers by becoming "firsts" in various aspects of law, such as law
school graduations, bar admissions, and achieving positions of
distinction in practice and public service;' 5 a following period of
optimism in the 1920s, when women lawyers hoped they would soon6
gain a position of equality with male practitioners in the profession;'
and then, in the 1930s, the sobering realization that true equality
would be far more difficult to achieve than initially hoped." We
benefit from the comparative perspective Drachman is able to add
15. See DRAcmi^IAN, supranote 7, at 37-64.
16. See DRACHMAN, supranote 7, at 168.
17. See DRAcHiAN,supra note 7, at 248.
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throughout this discussion by drawing on her previous research on
women in medicine; Drachman argues that law proved more resistant
to women's efforts at integration than medicine did, for many
reasons, including law's inherently conservative ideological
groundings.
Drachman's book combines a willingness to grapple with
controversial questions about women's "differences" and careful
historical analysis. Drachman convincingly shows that gender did
affect these early women lawyers' experiences, but often in complex
and unpredictable ways. Drachman documents, for example, that
the earliest practicing women lawyers were more likely to be married
than not - and more specifically, to be married to other lawyers.
The reason for this somewhat counterintuitive phenomenon,
Drachman explains, is that, in a profession in which virtually all
career opportunities remained closed to women, women lawyers
married to male attorneys were the only ones likely to find
employment - in their husbands'lawoffices."
In later periods, when the organization of practice had changed,
the relationship between marriage and a woman lawyer's chances of
professional success became more complicated. Women lawyers
debated about whether the gendered duties of married life were
incompatible with a professional career, especially in a field as
demanding as law. Many argued that having a marriage and a legal
career crucially depended on selecting a spouse willing to eschew the
gendered division of labor within marriage. Drachman's discussion
of the rise of ideals of "companionate" marriage is one of my favorite
aspects of her book, rich with vivid quotes and detail.' 9
Thus, Drachman does not shy away from discussing the subjective
aspects of early women lawyers' experiences. Drachman describes
early women lawyers as being caught in the "burden of double
consciousness - the tension between their gender and professional
identity."0
But Drachman is careful never to slip into the
reductionist or essentialist tendencies that sometimes mar discussion
of these matters. At every turn, Drachman emphasizes the great
diversity of women's views. Some early women lawyers reported that
their "gendered" consciousness affected the way they practiced law
and the kinds of work they chose to do; others equally vehemently
denied any such connection. Some felt a special duty to work for the
improvement of society; others cared about success and wealth.
18. See DRACHMAN, supranote 7, at 103.
19. See DRACHMAN, supranote 7, at 211-14.
20. DRAcHMAN, supra note 7, at 248.
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Drachman is particularly good at highlighting the way in which
class privilege intersected with early white women lawyers' efforts to
gain entry into the legal profession.' She does not hesitate to expose
the race prejudice that went hand-in-hand with some efforts to
increase opportunities for women in the law.22 Drachman is also
careful to include a considerable amount of material on the
accomplishments of early black women lawyers. 3
What Drachman's analysis lacks, however, is a sustained focus on
the difference race made to the experience of being a woman lawyer.
It is perhaps not fair to fault her for this flaw, given the very small
numbers of black women lawyers in practice during the period she
covers and the many other themes Drachman is juggling throughout
the book. But it is nevertheless clear that all the complex aspects of
women lawyers' historical experience must eventually be understood
together if we are to properly analyze the development of the
American legal profession. We are thus fortunate to have both Sisters
in Law and Rebels in Law to read together in pursuing this quest.

21. See DRAcIHNm, supranote 7, at 133-35.
22. See DRAcHMAN, supranote 7, at 149-57.
23. See DRAcHMAN, supranote 7, at 160-61, 206-10, 220-21.

HARD BARGAINS
JOAN WILLIAMS*
How many books about law can you read on a skiing vacation and
not regret the choice?
Hard Bargains' is one of them. It is about sex. One of my chief
regrets, despite my awkward contentment with middle age, is that my
own interest in sex is not professional. I ask myself: why on earth did
I pass up the opportunity of writing about sex for a living?
Feminists have long been confused about sex. That is one reason
they have not been at the forefront of the discussion on the scandal
that gave rise to impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.
In the eyes of some feminists, the sex between Monica Lewinsky and
the President was consensual sex between adults. Exposing their
relationship is precisely the kind of surveillance that traditionally has
hurt women. In the eyes of others, Lewinsky's eroticizing of Clinton's
prominent position - "I'm going to put on my presidential knee
pads" - is the kind of sexuality that historically has victimized
women. Who is right?
These issues go beyond the Lewinsky scandal. For example, what
are feminists to think about adultery? As Hard Bargains points out,
fully one-fourth of married men have had adulterous affairs,
something any divorce lawyer knows. Yet, we hesitate to condemn
adultery.
It sounds old-fashioned, Victorian, unliberated,...
unfeminist.
HardBargainsprovides an answer. To understand it requires us to
review the book. This is important because it articulates, in a careful
and measured way, an alternative to the two dominant views of
sexuality, associated with the "sex wars." On one side are the
antipornography feminists, whose position is now associated with
Catharine MacKinnon. MacKinnon opposes pornography on the
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ground that it causes the domination of women by eroticizing
dominance.
On the other side are commentators Ellen Willis,
Nadine Strossen and Joan Nestle, whose wonderful "My Mother
Loved to Fuck" epitomizes their view of sexuality as a key site of
liberation and self-expression.3
What Hard Bargainsoffers is a feminist understanding of sexuality
more complex than that offered by either of the two sex-war camps.
It articulates a feminist agenda premised on the view that sexuality is
both potentially oppressive (when it eroticizes dominance) and
potentially liberatory. This more nuanced formulation does what
(the authors claim, and I believe them) feminism has never done
before: articulate a positive regime of sexual regulation that will offer
sexuality on better terms than those available under the current (if
unacknowledged) regime of sexual regulation. The final chapter
details the kinds of regulations on rape, prostitution, fornication, and
adultery that would characterize a new era of "hard bargains" in
which women get a better "deal" sexually than they do today.
In reaching their conclusions, the authors use two key concepts.
The most important is a new paradigm: their notion of the libertine
sexual regime.4 The book does not trace its origins to the licentious
aristocratic sexuality of Don Juan, Casanova, and Dangerous Liaisons.
Instead, it traces the democratization of libertine sexuality in the
1950s and 1960s. The description of this development is fascinating.
With so much being negotiated in the decentralized and fluid
space of daily life, libertinism has no shared structure of belief, and
the emerging attitude and way of life was inherently unstable. In
practice, libertinism embraced a classical liberal approach to sexual
regulation, embodied in the Model Penal Code and Griswold v.
Connecticut,5 and at the same time a utilitarian hedonism, reflected in
Kinsey's love affair with the orgasm and the sexual exaltation of the
Playboy philosophy.6
This passage hints at the analytical richness of the book's
combination of historical and philosophical analysis. From these
perspectives, libertinism emerges as a strain of liberalism that links a
libertarian aversion to government regulation with a hedonism that
2. See id. at 223 (noting that dominance reinforces a submissive role for women).
3. Id. at 224.
4. Id.at21.
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married couples have a fundamental right to privacy
in their marital relations, and that a Connecticut law that proscribed the use of contraceptives
by married couples was unconstitutional on that basis).
6. HIRsHMAN & LARSON, supranote 1, at 214.
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views sexuality as an integral part of spiritual and emotional selfactualization.
Feminists' confusion about libertinism is what has left them
without a confident voice on issues related to sexuality (except in
contexts, such as sexual harassment, where the goal is to brand
sexuality as inappropriate). Are the attacks on Bill Clinton, and
Robert Livingston's resignation as House Speaker, expressions of "a
new sexual McCarthyism" feminists should oppose?
Not to me. But neither does my dissatisfaction with adultery stem
from an inability to distinguish between heterosexual sex and rape.
It is therefore with a sense of relief that I read Hirshman and Larson
articulate the position that the values embedded ' 7in "sex in itself' do
not "preempt[] all criticism of its delivery system.

Though this no doubt reveals my ignorance, Hard Bargains
explained to me that there is a key problem with libertarianism. In
general, this problem can most easily be understood in market
contexts: free markets deliver all goods efficiently, including racism
and sexism. In the sexual context, libertinism leaves men free to
structure the terms of sexual encounters within a framework that
takes their economic power and cultural authority as a given. What
Hard Bargains proposes is a system of sexual regulation that offers
sexuality to women within a framework of "supported bargaining"
that ends the unattractive choice between no heterosexual sex, and
sex only available within a framework that maintains men's social
power over women.
Less satisfying to me is the book's other major analytical
framework: its use of bargaining theory." Bargaining theory, a branch
of game theory, is currently influential within legal feminism. It is
useful to the extent that it captures the way men's economic power
outside the household translates into power inside it, a theme
explored by sociologists since Blood and Wolfe introduced the topic
in the 1960s. Bargaining theory translates forty years of sociology
into the currently fashionable language of economics.
Economics as a language of human relations has many limitations,
some of which emerge from this book. The economic language
commodifies intimate relations in ways that are off-putting to many of
us, as when Larson and Hirshman refer to "sexual transactions.""
When did you last have a session of sexual bargaining followed by a
7. HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 1, at 216.
8. HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 1, at 23.
9. See, e.g., HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 1, at 20 (characterizing people as having
desires for sexual transactions).
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sexual transaction?
An alternative is a language of social power. While it seems hard to
imagine a language of social power with wide appeal in United States,
inventing one needs to be at the center of the feminist agenda.
Otherwise feminists who feel comfortable with talking about gender
and sexuality in the language of social power will feel uneasy with
analyses of power relations framed in the economic language of
bargaining theory. Robin West comes to mind, for she gave a
complimentary blurb for this book but called the bargain language
"controversial." In addition, indeed even more important, linking
power analysis with the language of economics leaves feminists open
to the charge that anyone who wants to equalize the social power
positions of men and women is advocating an agenda that will result
in the end of intimacy.
To summarize: This book is a good read. It introduces a new
analytical paradigm (libertinism) with impressive potential. And it
uses another analytical tool - bargaining theory - that is a net
liability for feminism. I will conclude with a roadmap of the book,
and explanation of how Hard Bargains helped me formulate my
thoughts of Monica and Bill.
Roadmap first: After an initial discussion of "the possibilities of
theory," Parts 1 and 2 discuss the early sexual regimes of Greece and
Judaism, and Christian thinkers from the early celibates to Aquinas
and Augustine. These were fascinating to me, not the least because
they remind us that the celebration of homosexuality in Greece (so
often favorably cited in gay studies) was an integral part of an oftenmisogynous regime designed to increase the sexual pleasure and
preserve the property rights of high-status men. A discussion of the
United States follows, and may hold more interest for the general
reader than for readers familiar with existing histories of
domesticity. 10 Throughout both of these beginning sections, and in
Parts 3 and 4 on libertinism and hard bargains, the history is
intertwined with philosophical analysis, which suffers from the
limitations of a canon-based study of politics, notably its difficulty in
capturing the complexity of the liberal tradition in America. This
proves only that intellectual history provides a more useful tool for
studying our political past than does canon-based political theory.
While I will leave readers to buy the book at their leisure and assess
its proposals on rape, concubinage, fornication, and sex with
children, I will end with some final words on the Impeachment
10. See Hirshman & LARSON, supranote 1, at 59 (beginning the chapter entitled "American
Beginnings" with colonial versions of sex).
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Couple.
Hard Bargains proposes to "restore to marriage a
nonnegotiable duty of sexual exclusivity."" It points out that the real
injury with respect to adultery (as opposed to fornication, which they
propose to decriminalize except when it involves children) is to the
injured spouse, not the state. Therefore, they propose a civil
compensation remedy for the injured spouse within marriage, and to
define adultery as marital fault in a new regime in which fault affects
property division upon death and divorce. This proposal leaves
people free to pursue sexual pleasure without requiring us as
feminists to endorse the behavior of a fifty-something married
President who has sex with a twenty-one-year-old for a month before
he (allegedly) bothered to learn her name. Even if Hillary would not
sue for damages, many other women would, and the way to a man's
brain, they always say, is through his wallet.

11. HIRSHMAN & LMZSON, supra note 1, at 285.

